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ABSTRACT 
TAYA R. COHEN: The Effects of Empathy on Intergroup Conflict and Aggression: 
Examining the Dual Roles of Empathy in Fostering  
Positive and Negative Intergroup Relations 
(Under the direction of Dr. Chester A. Insko) 
 
 
How does feeling empathy for others affect intergroup relations? The present research 
indicates that the answer to this question is more complex than might be suspected. Two 
experiments explored how empathic perspective-taking exercises that fostered feelings of 
concern for either ingroup or outgroup members affected intergroup conflict (Experiment 1) 
and intergroup aggression (Experiment 2). Results suggest that in the absence of provocation 
from an outgroup feeling empathy for outgroup members will foster positive intergroup 
relations, but in the presence of provocation from an outgroup feeling empathy for outgroup 
members will foster negative intergroup relations. Feeling empathy for ingroup members is 
likely to foster negative intergroup relations regardless of whether provocation is present. 
Importantly however, this research revealed that the effects of empathic perspective-taking 
on intergroup relations were moderated by gender and individual differences in empathic 
concern and guilt proneness. 
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CHAPTER I 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
With wars in the Middle East, Africa, and throughout the world claiming thousands 
of lives every year, intergroup conflict and aggression are not issues that can be ignored 
without consequence. The goal of the present research was to examine the dual roles of 
empathy in inhibiting and promoting intergroup conflict and aggression. While prior research 
suggests that empathy, or concern for others, may influence intergroup relations, many 
questions about the effects of empathy on intergroup conflict and aggression remain 
unanswered.  
No prior study has compared how intergroup relations are impacted by group 
members’ concern for ingroup members (ingroup empathy) versus their concern for outgroup 
members (outgroup empathy). It is possible that fostering empathy for outgroup members 
will promote more cooperative and less aggressive intergroup behavior, while fostering 
empathy for ingroup members will promote less cooperative and more aggressive intergroup 
behavior, but these hypotheses have yet to be empirically tested. Another unanswered 
question relates to the relationship between dispositional empathy and situational 
manipulations of empathy. It is possible that individual differences in empathy may attenuate 
or amplify the effectiveness of situational manipulations of empathy, but research in this area 
is sparse (for exceptions, see Davis, 1983b; Graziano, Habashi, Sheese, & Tobin, 2007). It is 
also possible that situational manipulations of empathy may affect the behavior of male and 
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female groups differently (cf. Eisenberg & Lennon, 1983). Investigating these latter two 
issues is important for determining for whom empathy interventions will be most successful. 
To begin to answer these questions, the current research explored how empathic perspective-
taking exercises, that fostered either ingroup empathy or outgroup empathy, interacted with 
individual differences in empathy to influence conflict and aggression between male and 
female groups.  
What is Empathy? 
Empathy is a multidimensional construct (Davis, 1983a, 1983b), and perhaps as a 
consequence of this multidimensionality, different researchers use the term somewhat 
differently (cf. Batson, Polycarpou, Harmon-Jones, Imhoff, Mitchener, Bednar, et al., 1997; 
Davis, 1983a; 1983b; Eisenberg, 2000; Stephen & Finlay, 1999). I use the term empathy to 
refer to an other-oriented affective response that is characterized by feelings of warmth, 
compassion, and concern for others. My usage of the term empathy corresponds to Stephen 
and Finlay’s (1999, p. 730) term “emotional empathy” and Eisenberg’s (2000, p. 672) term 
“sympathy.” In the Interpersonal Reactivity Index (IRI; Davis 1980), a widely-used 
individual difference measure of empathy, this emotional empathy dimension is called 
empathic concern—“a measure of emotional responsivity” (Davis, 1983a). Thus, empathy, as 
I use the term, is an other-oriented emotional response.  
Perspective taking, on the other hand, is a cognitive response (Davis, 1983a, 1983b; 
Galinsky, Maddux, Gilin, & White, in press). Perspective taking involves imagining yourself 
in someone else’s shoes (Batson, Lishner, Carpenter, Dulin, Harjusola-Webb, Stocks, et al., 
2003) or entertaining the point of view of others (Davis, 1983a, 1983b). Stephen and Finlay 
(1999, p. 730) refer to this as “cognitive empathy.” In the IRI (Davis, 1980) this cognitive 
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dimension is called perspective taking—the tendency of the respondent to adopt the 
psychological perspective of other people (Davis, 1983a, 1983b).  
Perspective-taking exercises may foster emotional empathy, but as Batson et al. 
(2003) have shown, not all types of perspective-taking exercises are equally effective at 
promoting emotional empathy. Whereas asking individuals to imagine how another person 
feels (“imagine-other perspective”; Batson et al., 2003) does promote concern for others, 
asking individuals to imagine themselves in the place of another person (“imagine-self 
perspective”; Batson et al., 2003) does not. In fact, Epley, Caruso, and Bazerman’s (2006) 
research on reactive egoism suggests that adopting the perspective of another group (as 
opposed to considering the feelings of another group) leads groups to expect more selfishness 
from the other group and in turn, leads groups to behave more selfishly toward the other 
group. Further evidence of the difference between empathy and perspective-taking comes 
from Galinsky and colleagues (in press), who found that perspective-taking was associated 
with individuals negotiating larger outcomes for themselves, whereas empathy was 
associated with individuals negotiating larger outcomes for their interaction partners.  
In the present research, I modified Batson et al.’s (2003) imagine other perspective-
taking exercise (i.e., an exercise that has participants imagine how others feel) to investigate 
how emotional empathy affects intergroup conflict (Experiment 1) and intergroup aggression 
(Experiment 2). The empathic perspective-taking exercise involved having participants 
imagine either how their fellow ingroup members were feeling about an upcoming intergroup 
interaction (ingroup empathy exercise) or how the members of the other group were feeling 
about an upcoming intergroup interaction (outgroup empathy exercise). I also included the 
empathic concern and perspective taking subscales from the IRI (Davis, 1980) to test whether 
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individual differences in emotional empathy and cognitive perspective-taking moderate the 
influence of the empathic perspective-taking exercises (cf. Davis, 1983b). 
Evidence for the Role of Empathy in Fostering Positive Intergroup Relations 
Miller and Eisenberg (1988) conducted a quantitative review of over 50 studies 
investigating how empathy (i.e., “an emotional response evoked by the affective state or 
situation of the other person”; p. 325) relates to aggression, antisocial behavior, and physical 
abuse. They found significant negative correlations with empathy and each of these 
constructs. In a similar review, Eisenberg and Miller (1987) found significant positive 
correlations between empathy and prosocial behavior. While these reviews provide strong 
evidence for the role of empathy in promoting positive relations between individuals, the 
studies reviewed did not examine how empathy influences intergroup relations.  
Stephan and Finlay (1999) reviewed research examining the role of empathy in 
improving intergroup relations. Their review found that feeling empathy for outgroup 
members is associated with reductions in prejudice. They point out, for example, that 
cooperative learning techniques, such as “the jigsaw classroom” (Aronson & Bridgeman, 
1979; Aronson & Patnoe, 1997), help reduce prejudice toward outgroups by increasing 
participants’ feelings of empathy for outgroup members. However, none of the experiments 
reviewed by Stephen and Finlay (1999) tested whether feeling empathy for outgroup 
members promotes positive intergroup behavior—the experiments in their review tested for 
differences in attitudes, not actual behaviors. 
While prior experimental research on empathy has been largely limited to 
investigations of attitudes toward outgroups or interindividual behavior, there are several 
correlational studies that suggest that feeling empathy for outgroups is associated with 
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positive intergroup relations. For example, Shechtman and Basheer (2005) found that the 
more empathy Arab children felt toward Jewish children, the less likely they were to support 
aggression toward them. Malhotra and Liyanage (2005) found that Tamil and Sinhalese high 
school students living in Sri Lanka who had participated in a four-day peace workshop were 
more likely, one year later, to report empathic feelings toward the outgroup and donate 
money to an outgroup charity than were Tamil and Sinhalese students who had not 
participated in the workshop. This finding is particularly striking because the hostility 
between the Tamils (a Hindu group) and the Sinhalese (a Buddhist group) has plagued Sri 
Lanka with civil warfare for over 20 years. Moreover, after attending the peace workshop, 
most participants returned to a community in which they had no interactions with the other 
group for a year, suggesting that empathy promoted by peace workshops can have long-
lasting effects. 
Pettigrew (1998) suggested that the effectiveness of intergroup contact in improving 
intergroup relations may stem in part from outgroup empathy or outgroup perspective taking. 
Malhotra and Liyanage’s (2005) findings support this idea, as do findings by Hewstone, 
Cairns, Voci, Hamberger, & Niens (2006). Hewstone et al. found that intergroup contact 
between Protestants and Catholics in Northern Ireland was positively related to outgroup 
perspective-taking, more favorable attitudes and trust of the outgroup, and forgiveness. 
Evidence for the Role of Empathy in Fostering Negative Intergroup Relations 
Most prior research on empathy in intergroup relations has focused on the positive 
effects of empathy directed at outgroups (Stephan & Finlay, 1999). Unfortunately, there is a 
dark side to empathy as well. Researchers have suggested that one cause of terrorism is 
strong concern for one’s ingroup (McCauley, 2007; Post, Sprinzak, & Denny, 2003; 
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Sageman, 2004; Victoroff, 2005). According to Post et al. (2003), terrorists’ collective 
identity often subsumes their individual identity: “This fusion with the group seems to 
provide the necessary justification for their actions with an attendant loss of felt 
responsibility” (Post et al., 2003, p. 176). This emerging research on terrorism suggests that 
extreme ingroup empathy may lead to extreme violence toward outgroups. 
Research on “group morality” provides further evidence of the harmful role of 
ingroup empathy in intergroup relations (T. R. Cohen, Montoya, & Insko, 2006). When 
group members are focused on their ingroup, moral norms, or group morality, encourage 
them to do what is best for their own group regardless of the consequences for outgroups (T. 
R. Cohen et al., 2006; Wildschut & Insko, 2006). In conflict situations, such as the prisoner’s 
dilemma game (Kelley, Holmes, Kerr, Reis, Rusbult, & Van Lange, 2003), doing what is 
best for one’s own group often requires hurting those in other groups. Thus, following the 
codes of group morality can make groups act less cooperatively (or more competitively) 
toward outgroups (T. R. Cohen et al., 2006; Pinter, Insko, Wildschut, Montoya, Kirchner, & 
Wolf, 2007; Wildschut & Insko, 2006). 
In a previous study (T. R. Cohen et al., 2006, Study 2) I tested whether inducing 
group members to feel empathy for those in their ingroup would motivate them to act in line 
with the codes of group morality. Specifically, I tested whether having group members 
engage in an ingroup empathy perspective-taking exercise would lead them to act less 
cooperatively (more competitively) toward the outgroup. This study also measured individual 
differences in guilt proneness (Tangney & Dearing, 2002). Guilt is a moral emotion 
(Tangney & Dearing, 2002) that motivates individuals to “do the right thing” (i.e., behave in 
accordance with norms). People feel guilty when they violate moral rules and imperatives. I 
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hypothesized that group members high in guilt proneness would be most influenced by the 
ingroup empathy exercise because these group members would be the most likely to conform 
to the codes of group morality. Consistent with hypotheses, I found an interaction such that 
the ingroup empathy exercise made participants high, but not low, in guilt proneness less 
likely to cooperate with the outgroup (more likely to compete) compared to participants in a 
control condition. These results suggest that among group members concerned with being 
moral, ingroup empathy is associated with less cooperation (or more competition) with 
outgroups.  
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER II 
 
EXPERIMENT 1: EMPATHY AND INTERGROUP CONFLICT 
Empathy and the Prisoner’s Dilemma Game 
Experiment 1 used a variation of the prisoner’s dilemma game (PDG) to investigate 
how empathy affects intergroup conflict. The PDG is a commonly used method for modeling 
conflict in a laboratory setting. The PDG represents a dilemma in which each side can 
increase its outcomes by always acting competitively instead of cooperatively; but if both 
sides act competitively, they will both receive lower outcomes than they could have obtained 
through both acting cooperatively. According to Ridley (1996), “Broadly speaking any 
situation in which you are tempted to do something, but know it would be a great mistake if 
everybody did the same thing, is likely to be a prisoner’s dilemma.” 
While thousands of studies have used the PDG to study conflict (e.g., Axelrod, 1984; 
Kelley et al., 2003; Poundstone, 1992; Wildschut, Pinter, Vevea, Insko, & Schopler, 2003), 
only three prior studies have investigated how behavior in the PDG is affected by feelings of 
empathy (Batson & Ahmad, 2001; Batson & Moran, 1999; T. R. Cohen et al., 2006). Batson 
and colleagues have shown that when women are made to feel empathy for another 
individual, they are more likely to cooperate with that individual (Batson & Moran, 1999), 
even after learning that the other individual acted competitively toward them (Batson & 
Ahmad, 2001). While these two experiments by Batson suggest that feeling empathy for 
one’s interaction partner promotes cooperative behavior toward them, their implications for 
  
9 
 
intergroup conflict are limited because the studies used only female participants, and did not 
investigate how empathy affects intergroup behavior.  
The only other study to investigate empathy in the PDG was by T. R. Cohen and 
colleagues (2006, Study 2). As discussed earlier, this experiment found that making 
participants feel empathy for fellow ingroup members caused participants high in guilt 
proneness to act competitively (uncooperatively) toward the outgroup. While this experiment 
found that fostering feelings of empathy for ingroup members lead some groups (i.e., those 
concerned with behaving in line with moral norms) to behave uncooperatively in the PDG, it 
did not test whether feeling empathy for outgroup members also influences intergroup 
cooperation and competition. 
PDG-Alt Matrix 
To investigate the effects of empathy on intergroup relations, I compared how 
feelings of empathy for outgroup members versus ingroup members influenced intergroup 
conflict using a variation of the traditional PDG—the three-choice PDG-Alt matrix (Figure 
1). In a traditional two-choice PDG, each side can either choose to cooperate or compete 
(Kelley et al., 2003). The PDG-Alt adds a third possible choice, withdrawal, which 
guarantees intermediate outcomes for both sides (Insko, Kirchner, Pinter, Efaw, & 
Wildschut, 2005; Insko, Schopler, Hoyle, Dardis, & Graetz, 1990). In a two-choice PDG, a 
competitive choice reflects both motivation to protect oneself from one’s opponent (i.e., fear 
or distrust) and motivation to exploit one’s opponent (i.e., greed). If it is known by both sides 
that there will be only one trial (so that tactical withdrawal is not an option), the PDG-Alt 
unconfounds fear and greed motivations: Competition reflects greed; withdrawal reflects fear 
or distrust. Because a withdrawal choice guarantees equal outcomes for both sides, 
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withdrawal may also be motivated by concerns for fairness. Cooperation can be motivated by 
concerns for fairness as well, but cooperation is the only choice that can maximally benefit 
both groups.  
In the PDG-Alt, as in many conflict situations, cooperation is inherently risky. 
Although cooperation yields the highest joint payoff, it can easily be exploited. By testing for 
differences in cooperation, I could investigate whether outgroup empathy would induce 
groups to take a risk and cooperate with the outgroup. Analyzing cooperation also allowed 
me to test whether ingroup empathy would lead groups high in guilt proneness to forgo 
cooperation in order to benefit their ingroup (T. R. Cohen et al., 2006).  
Although both competition and withdrawal may benefit one’s ingroup, withdrawal is 
a “nicer” choice than competition. Competition is a greed-based response, whereas 
withdrawal is not. Comparing competition and withdrawal allowed me to test whether 
outgroup empathy would make groups less willing to exploit opponents by acting 
competitively toward them. Because both withdrawal and competition can benefit one’s 
ingroup, I expected the ingroup empathy exercise to primarily influence cooperation (in a 
negative direction), as opposed to competition versus withdrawal. 
Method 
Participants in the study were 356 students (113 men, 243 women) enrolled in 
introductory psychology classes. The key independent variable was an empathy 
manipulation, which took the form of a writing exercise. Other independent variables 
included gender (a comparison of all male sessions with all female sessions), the empathic 
concern (EC) and perspective taking (PT) subscales of the IRI (Davis, 1980) and the guilt 
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and shame subscales of the Test of Self-Conscious Affect (TOSCA; Tangney, Wagner, & 
Gramzow, 1989).  
At the start of each experimental session, participants completed a consent form and 
two individual difference measures: the IRI (Davis, 1980, 1983a) and the TOSCA (Tangney 
et al., 1989). 
Interpersonal Reactivity Index 
The IRI (Davis, 1980, 1983a) asks participants to read a series of statements and rate 
how well each statement describes them. The EC subscale of the IRI measures the tendency 
to experience feelings of warmth, compassion, and concern for other people (e.g., “When I 
see someone being taken advantage of, I feel kind of protective towards them.”), and can be 
regarded as the affective component of empathy. The PT subscale of the IRI measures the 
tendency to adopt the point of view of other people (e.g., “When I’m upset at someone, I 
usually try to ‘put myself in his shoes’ for a while.”), and can be regarded as the cognitive 
component of empathy.  
Ratings were made on a 5-point scale (0 = does not describe me well; 4 = describes 
me very well). There are seven items in the EC subscale (α = .80), and seven items in the PT 
subscale (α = .82). Appropriate items were reverse-coded, and IRI scores were standardized 
to z-scores before conducting analyses. Higher values on the EC and PT scales represent 
greater empathic concern and greater perspective taking, respectively.  
Consistent with previous research on gender differences in empathy (Eisenberg & 
Lennon, 1983), women scored higher than men on both EC, F(1, 354) =  61.35, p < .001, and 
PT, F(1, 354) = 10.03, p = .002. EC (raw mean scores): women M = 3.02 (SD = .54); men M 
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= 2.51 (SD = .66). PT (raw mean scores): women: M = 2.53 (SD = .67); men M = 2.28 (SD = 
.74). 
Test of Self-Conscious Affect  
The TOSCA (Tangney et al., 1989) is a scenario-based guilt and shame measure, in 
which individuals are asked to imagine a situation (e.g., “While out with a group of friends, 
you make fun of a friend who’s not there.”), and then rate how likely it is that they would 
react in certain ways (e.g., “You would apologize and talk about that person’s good points.”). 
Ratings were made on a 7-point scale (0 = not at all likely; 6 = extremely likely).  
The TOSCA defines guilt and shame in accordance with Lewis’s (1971) conception 
of the two constructs. According to Lewis (1971), “The experience of shame is directly about 
the self, which is the focus of evaluation. In guilt, the self is not the central object of negative 
evaluation, but rather the thing done or undone is the focus” (p. 30). There are 15 items in the 
guilt subscale (α = .75), and 15 items in the shame subscale (α = .79). TOSCA scores were 
standardized to z-scores before conducting analyses. Higher values on the guilt and shame 
scales represent greater guilt proneness and greater shame proneness, respectively. 
Women scored higher than men on both guilt, F(1, 354) =  77.58, p < .001, and 
shame, F(1, 354) =  24.32, p < .001. Guilt (raw mean scores): women M = 4.45 (SD = .57); 
men M = 3.84 (SD = .69). Shame (raw mean scores): women M = 2.90 (SD = .84); men M = 
2.45 (SD = .73). 
Procedure 
Participants arrived at the lab in groups of six, and upon arrival, were seated in 
individual rooms where they completed the personality measures and five copies of a short 
information sheet (see Appendix) that were to be exchanged prior to the “social interaction 
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task.” The purpose of the exchange was to support the empathy manipulation by supposedly 
facilitating acquaintanceship. After completing these measures, participants were assigned to 
one of two three-person groups (a “bolded group” or an “outlined group”) and given 
instructions regarding the social interaction task.  
Participants were informed that in the social interaction task their group would 
interact with the other group and each person would have the opportunity to earn money. 
Each participant was given a copy of the PDG-Alt matrix (Figure 1) with the following 
instructions. 
The interaction between your group and the group with whom you are interacting will 
be expressed using a matrix. In this matrix, your group has three choices, X, Y, and Z. 
The group with whom you are interacting has the same matrix and also has the same 
three choices. The numbers in the diagram below represent the payoffs in pennies for 
both groups for each of the possible combinations of choices that could occur. In each 
square of the interaction matrix, the bolded group’s payoff is located in the upper 
right corner and the outlined group’s payoff is located in the lower left corner. Please 
note that the amounts in each cell represent the total payoff for the group; the money 
will be split evenly between the three group members. Each group’s decision will be 
determined by majority vote. In the event that there is no majority vote (i.e., each 
group member votes for a different letter), your group will be asked to re-vote. 
 
Following these instructions, participants completed several exercises to ensure 
understanding of the matrix. Participants were informed that there would be just one 
interaction in the payoff matrix and following the interaction each person would be dismissed 
individually (i.e., they would not meet the other participants). 
After the matrix training, participants were given an opportunity to “get to know” the 
other participants. Participants were told the following: 
When completing this kind of task, we have found from previous research that 
participants prefer to have some information about each other before casting their 
votes. For this reason, we had you complete the information sheets at the beginning of 
this session. Now each of you will be given a folder containing information about the 
other participants in today’s study. Please read over this information in order to get to 
know the other participants. 
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All participants were given the same five bogus information sheets. The Appendix 
lists the bogus information in italics. These responses were based on answers given during 
pilot testing. The bogus information sheets were included because pilot testing revealed that 
participants found it easier to feel empathy for people whom they had never met if they first 
were provided with some information about them. The empathy manipulation was 
implemented after participants were given a few moments to read over the information 
sheets. 
The empathy manipulation involved a writing exercise adapted from a procedure used 
by Batson and colleagues (Batson et al., 2003; Batson & Ahmad, 2001; Batson & Moran, 
1999; see also T. R. Cohen et al., 2006). All participants read: “You have been randomly 
selected to complete a thought exercise. The other participants in today’s session will 
complete additional measures of personality instead of this exercise.” After this statement, 
participants in the outgroup empathy condition read the following instructions: 
In this exercise we would like for you to imagine how the members of the other group 
feel. That is, imagine how the members of the other group are likely to feel while 
considering their votes. Imagine also the members of the other group will likely feel 
when they learn each group’s decision. Take about one minute for this imagination 
exercise, getting as clear a sense as possible of how the members of the other group 
likely feel. Then, at the end of the minute, write down what you imagined. We have 
found that carefully following this procedure can ensure understanding of the 
upcoming interaction. 
 
Participants in the ingroup empathy condition received identical instructions except 
the phrase “your own group” was substituted for “the other group.” Participants in the 
objective condition received instructions that asked them to remain objective: 
In this exercise, we would like for you to think about the upcoming interaction. While 
thinking about the upcoming interaction, try to take an objective perspective. That is, 
try not to get caught up in how the other participants in today’s experiment feel; just 
remain objective and detached. Take about one minute for this thought exercise, 
getting as clear a sense as possible of the upcoming interaction. Then, at the end of 
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the minute, write down what you thought about. We have found that carefully 
following this procedure can ensure understanding of the upcoming interaction. 
Participants were given approximately 10 minutes to work on the writing exercise.  
Following the exercise, participants were reminded that there would be just one 
interaction and they would not meet any other participant. Then they were asked to circle 
their vote, X, Y, or Z. After votes were collected, participants completed open- and closed-
ended assessments of reasons for their PDG-Alt vote, were given their money, debriefed, and 
dismissed. 
Dependent Variables 
PDG-Alt choice. The main dependent variable was participants’ vote in the PDG-Alt 
matrix (Figure 1): X represents cooperation, Y represents withdrawal, and Z represents 
competition. For statistical analyses, PDG-Alt choices were partitioned into two planned 
orthogonal contrasts: (a) cooperation versus competition and withdrawal combined; and (b) 
competition versus withdrawal. Given the forced-choice dependency, the first contrast is 
equivalent to looking at cooperation alone. The second contrast only includes participants 
who did not cooperate. 
Reasons for PDG-Alt choice. Reasons for the PDG-Alt choice were assessed first, 
with an open-ended question and, second, with closed-ended ratings. The open-ended 
question was as follows: “If you chose ‘X’ (‘Y’, ‘Z’ respectively), what was your reason (or 
reasons) for doing so?” Two judges coded these responses for the presence of five possible 
reasons: (a) concern for maximizing own outcomes (e.g., “I wanted my group to earn as 
much as possible”), max own (κ = .89); (b) concern for maximizing relative outcomes (e.g., 
“I wanted my group to earn more than the other group”), max rel (κ = .87); (c) concern for 
maximizing joint outcomes (e.g., “I wanted both groups to earn as much as possible 
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together”), max joint (κ = .88); (d) concern for minimizing the differences between the two 
groups (e.g., “I wanted both groups to earn an equal amount”), min dif (κ = .86); and (e) 
distrust (e.g., “I wanted to defend my group against the actions of the other group”; κ = .98). 
After responding to the open-ended question, participants completed closed-ended ratings of 
the five reasons. Ratings were made on 7-point scales (1 = not at all, 7 = very much). Higher 
scores indicate greater endorsement of the reason. 
Because separate analyses of the open- and closed-ended assessments yielded similar 
results and because the two types of assessments were correlated, z-transformed composites 
were formed for each of the five reasons. Composites were created by first standardizing and 
then averaging open- and closed-ended assessments of the same reason. Reliability 
coefficients for these composites were: .73 for max own; .61 for max rel; .71 for max joint; 
.70 for min dif; and .57 for distrust.  
Empathy manipulation check. The content of the writing exercise was coded to assess 
the validity of the empathy manipulation. Two raters coded for whether the participant 
thought about either group (ingroup thoughts, κ = .74; outgroup thoughts, κ = .78), and 
whether the participant discussed the feelings of either group (ingroup feelings, κ = .81; 
outgroup feelings, κ = .78). The judges’ ratings were averaged to form indices of these 
manipulation checks. Each index ranged from 0 (did not mention thoughts / feelings) to 1 
(mentioned thoughts / feelings). 
Data Analysis 
Logistic regression was used to investigate how the empathy manipulation, gender, 
and the individual difference variables (e.g., empathic concern, guilt) influenced (a) 
cooperation and (b) competition versus withdrawal. The empathy manipulation was 
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partitioned into two planned orthogonal contrasts: (a) outgroup empathy (coded 1) versus 
objective (coded -1); (b) ingroup empathy (coded 1) versus outgroup empathy and objective 
combined (each coded -.5). Gender was coded 0 for men and 1 for women. Because 
participants were seated in individual rooms and never met or interacted with the other 
participants, the unit of analysis was the individual group member.  
The logistic regression analyses were conducted in two steps. The first step contained 
the empathy manipulation contrasts, gender, and the empathy manipulation by gender 
interactions. In the second step, EC, guilt, and the corresponding interaction terms were 
added. In preliminary analyses, I also included PT and shame, but there were no significant 
main effects or interactions for these variables. Because I did not have hypotheses regarding 
the PT and shame assessments, I do not discuss them further. 
Results 
Empathy Manipulation Check 
Table 1 shows the results for the empathy manipulation check. As expected, 
participants in the ingroup empathy condition thought about and discussed the feelings of 
their ingroup more than participants in the other conditions. Likewise, participants in the 
outgroup empathy condition thought about and discussed the feelings of the outgroup more 
than participants in the other conditions. Unexpectedly, in the outgroup empathy condition, 
women were more likely than men to discuss the feelings of the outgroup. 
Step 1: PDG-Alt Choice as a Function of the Empathy Condition and Gender 
Table 2 presents the PDG-Alt means by empathy condition and gender. Table 3 
presents logistic regression results of the step 1 models. 
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Cooperation. For cooperation, there was a significant main effect for the outgroup 
empathy versus objective contrast, B = .64, SE = .30, p = .03, that was qualified by a 
significant Gender X Outgroup Empathy interaction, B = -.73, SE = .36, p = .04 (see Table 
3). The outgroup empathy manipulation caused significant increases in cooperation for men, 
B = .64, SE = .30, p = .03, but not for women, B = -.09, SE = 1.00, p = .93. This interaction is 
interesting in light of the Gender X Outgroup Empathy interaction for the outgroup feelings 
manipulation check. As shown in Table 1, the outgroup empathy manipulation was relatively 
more effective for women. So, even though the outgroup empathy manipulation appeared to 
work better for women, men were more affected by it. 
Competition versus withdrawal. Neither the empathy manipulation nor gender 
significantly influenced competition versus withdrawal in the step 1 model (see Table 3). 
Step 2: PDG-Alt Choice as a Function of EC, Guilt, Empathy Condition, and Gender 
Table 4 presents the PDG-Alt choice means by EC, guilt, empathy condition, and 
gender. Table 5 presents logistic regression results for the step 2 models.  
For cooperation, there were two significant interactions: (a) EC X Outgroup Empathy 
and (b) Guilt X Ingroup Empathy. For competition versus withdrawal, there was a significant 
EC X Outgroup Empathy interaction, which was qualified by a significant Gender X EC X 
Outgroup Empathy interaction. These interactions are depicted in Figures 2, 3, and 4, and are 
described in greater detail below.  
Cooperation regressed on EC X Outgroup Empathy. Figure 2 shows the significant 
interaction between EC and the outgroup empathy contrast, B = -.56, SE = .23, p = .02. 
Probing the interaction (Preacher, Curran, & Bauer, 2006) revealed differences primarily 
among those low in EC. Low-EC participants (1 SD below the mean) in the outgroup 
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empathy condition were more cooperative than low-EC participants in the objective 
condition, t(342) = 2.71, p = .007. The difference between the outgroup empathy and 
objective conditions was nonsignificant for participants with average EC scores, t(342) = 
1.48, p = .14, and high EC scores, t(342) = -.17, p = .86. Greater EC was associated with 
greater cooperation in the objective condition, B = .95, SE = .44, p = .03, but not in the 
outgroup empathy condition, B = -.16, SE = .36, p = .65. 
Cooperation regressed on Guilt X Ingroup Empathy. Figure 3 shows the significant 
interaction between guilt and the ingroup empathy contrast, B = -.59, SE = .29, p = .04. 
Probing the guilt by ingroup empathy interaction revealed differences primarily among those 
high in guilt. High-guilt participants (1 SD above the mean) in the ingroup empathy condition 
were less cooperative than high-guilt participants in the other conditions, t(342) = -1.98, p = 
.049. The difference between the ingroup empathy condition and the other conditions was 
nonsignificant for participants with average guilt scores, t(342) = -1.41, p = .16, and low guilt 
scores, t(342) = -.05, p = .96. Greater guilt proneness was associated with less cooperation in 
the ingroup empathy condition, B = -.92, SE = .47, p = .04, but not in the other conditions, B 
= -.04, SE = .33, p = .92. 
Competition versus Withdrawal regressed on Gender X EC X Outgroup Empathy. 
Figure 4 shows the significant three-way interaction between gender, EC, and the outgroup 
empathy contrast for competition versus withdrawal, B = 1.36, SE = .59, p = .02. Breaking 
down the Gender X EC X Outgroup Empathy interaction by gender revealed a significant EC 
X Outgroup Empathy interaction for men, B = -1.25, SE = .53, p = .02, but not for women, B 
= .11, SE = .26, p = .68. Whereas the outgroup empathy exercise made men low in EC 
significantly more likely to compete than withdraw, t(273) = 1.98, p = .048, the outgroup 
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empathy exercise made men high in EC marginally more likely to withdraw than compete, 
t(273) = -1.79, p = .07.  
Analyzing competition and withdrawal separately revealed approximately symmetric 
effects. For men in the outgroup empathy condition, greater EC was associated with 
significantly less competition, B = -1.48, SE = .58, p = .01, and significantly more 
withdrawal, B = 1.49, SE = .50, p = .004. For men in the objective condition, neither the 
relationship between EC and competition, B = .31, SE = .42, p = .46, nor EC and withdrawal, 
B = -.74, SE = .41, p = .08, was significant (although the relationship between EC and 
withdrawal was marginal). 
Potential Mediation of PDG-Alt Choice by Reasons Assessments 
Potential mediation by the choice reasons (i.e., max own, max rel, max joint, min dif, 
and distrust) was assessed using MacKinnon, Lockwood, Hoffman, West, and Sheets’ (2002) 
mediation procedure. Mediation is established when (a) the independent variable 
significantly influences the mediating variable, (b) the influence of the proposed mediator is 
significant when including the proposed mediator and the independent variable as predictors 
of the dependent variable, and (c) the indirect effect of the mediating variable is significant. 
According to MacKinnon et al. (2002), the critical z′ values for testing mediation are .97 for 
α = .05 and 1.10 for α = .01. Except for the difference in critical values, the Mackinnon z′ test 
is equivalent to Sobel’s (1982) test for mediation. 
Cooperation mediation. The Gender X Outgroup Empathy interaction that 
significantly predicted cooperation in the first PDG-Alt model did not significantly predict 
any of the reasons.  
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Neither of the two interactions that significantly predicted cooperation in the second 
PDG-Alt model (EC X Outgroup Empathy; Guilt X Ingroup Empathy) significantly 
predicted any of the reasons. However, there was a marginal effect of EC X Outgroup 
Empathy on distrust, B = .12, SE = .07, p = .08. When distrust was included as a covariate in 
the cooperation model, distrust was significant, B = -2.32, SE = .36, p < .001, while the EC X 
Outgroup Empathy interaction was not, B = -.41, SE = .27, p = .14. EC X Outgroup Empathy 
did not interact with distrust, B = -.29, SE = .43, p = .50, which supports the assumption of 
homogeneity of regression. Although the effect of EC X Outgroup Empathy on distrust was 
marginal, a MacKinnon z΄ test revealed a significant mediating effect of distrust on 
cooperation, z΄ = 1.66, p < .01. The MacKinnon z΄ test suggests that distrust may mediate the 
effect of EC X Outgroup Empathy on cooperation. 
Competition versus withdrawal mediation. Gender X EC X Outgroup Empathy 
significantly predicted max own, B = .31, SE = .15, p = .04 and max rel, B = .41, SE = .14, p 
= .004. When max own and max rel were entered into the competition versus withdrawal 
model, max own, B = 2.25, SE = .35, p < .001, and max rel, B = 2.05, SE = .44, p < .001, 
were each significant, while Gender X EC X Outgroup Empathy was not, B = 1.57, SE = 
1.31, p = .23. Max own and max rel were each associated with more competition (max own B 
= 2.12, SE = .32, p < .001; max rel B = 2.10, SE = .41, p < .001) and less withdrawal (max 
own B = -.92, SE = .18, p < .001; max rel B = -.71, SE = .24, p = .003). Gender X EC X 
Outgroup Empathy did not interact with max own, B = -1.77, SE = 1.43, p = .22, or max rel, 
B = 1.76, SE = 1.68, p = .30, which supports the assumption of homogeneity of regression.  
A MacKinnon z΄ test revealed significant mediating effects of max own (z΄ = 2.00, p 
< .01) and max rel (z΄ = 2.46, p < .01) on competition versus withdrawal. These results are 
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consistent with the possibility that max own and max rel fully mediate the effect of Gender X 
EC X Outgroup Empathy on competition versus withdrawal. 
It should be noted that assumptions regarding mediation may be violated. First, 
because the reasons assessments contained measurement error, the relationships between the 
reasons and PDG-Alt choice could be spurious. Second, because the reasons assessments 
took place after the assessment of PDG-Alt choice, it could be that the reasons participants 
gave for their choices were consequences of the choice, as opposed to causes. Therefore, 
although the mediational analyses are consistent with the possibility of full mediation by 
distrust for cooperation, and max own and max rel for competition versus withdrawal, they 
do not provide definitive evidence for such mediation.   
Discussion 
In Experiment 1, I manipulated both ingroup empathy (i.e., consideration of the 
feelings of ingroup members) and outgroup empathy (i.e., consideration of the feelings of 
outgroup members) in order to investigate the dual roles of empathy in increasing and 
decreasing intergroup conflict.  
The Role of Empathy in Increasing Intergroup Conflict 
The first question I sought to answer in Experiment 1 was whether ingroup empathy 
leads groups to forgo cooperation in order to benefit their ingroup. Consistent with prior 
research (T. R. Cohen et al., 2006), and as shown in Figure 3, the ingroup empathy exercise 
decreased cooperation among group members high in guilt proneness (and by implication 
increased competition and withdrawal). Group morality norms discourage cooperation with 
outgroups because behaving cooperatively puts one’s ingroup at risk of being exploited. The 
Experiment 1 results showed that it was primarily group members who were high in guilt 
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proneness that were influenced by the ingroup empathy exercise (see also T. R. Cohen, 
2006). Guilt is a moral emotion (Tangney & Dearing, 2002), and the fact that the ingroup 
empathy exercises reduced cooperation among guilt-prone group members supports the idea 
that moral imperatives discourage cooperation with outgroups. The current results extend 
prior research on group morality (T. R. Cohen et al., 2006; Pinter, et al., 2007; Wildschut & 
Insko, 2006) by showing that group morality does not necessarily require competition with 
outgroups: Withdrawal is an acceptable option as well. What group morality does discourage 
is putting one’s ingroup at risk by cooperating with outgroups. 
The Role of Empathy in Decreasing Intergroup Conflict 
The second question I sought to answer was whether outgroup empathy is an 
effective tool for promoting cooperation between groups. The short answer is yes, but 
perhaps not for everyone. As shown in Figure 2, the outgroup empathy perspective-taking 
exercise promoted cooperation among group members who were low, but not high, in 
empathic concern. It is possible that high EC participants were already inclined to act 
cooperatively toward the outgroup and did not require instructions to be empathic toward 
them (cf. Graziano et al., 2007). Mediation analyses suggested that the increase in 
cooperation caused by the outgroup empathy exercise may have occurred because of 
corresponding reductions in distrust. These findings are encouraging because they show that 
group members who are not dispositionally inclined to feel empathic concern for others can 
be made to trust outgroups and act cooperatively toward them by simply being asked to think 
for a few moments about their feelings.  
An advantage of the PDG-Alt matrix is that it allows for separate assessments of 
cooperation, withdrawal, and competition. Through my use of this matrix, I was able to show 
  
24 
 
that outgroup empathy exercise affected not only cooperation, but also competition versus 
withdrawal. As shown in Figure 4, the outgroup empathy exercise worked in combination 
with high dispositional empathic concern to make male groups less likely to compete and 
more likely to withdraw from conflict. The mediation results suggest that this occurred 
because of reductions in greed motivation (i.e., reductions in the desire to maximize absolute 
and relative ingroup outcomes).  
Individual differences in empathy. It is possible that a stronger manipulation of 
outgroup empathy would have increased cooperation among all group members, not just 
those low in empathic concern. Likewise, a stronger manipulation of outgroup empathy 
might also have decreased competition among all group members, not just among men high 
in empathic concern. Few studies have investigated both situational manipulations of 
empathy along with dispositional assessments of empathy. Davis’ (1983b) study with 
individuals is a notable exception. He found that the EC subscale of the IRI moderated the 
impact of an empathy manipulation on interindividual helping. Davis’ (1983b) empathy 
manipulation was very similar to the one used here. Participants in his study received a 
message from fictional woman in which she asked participants to help her by baby-sitting, 
doing chores, and providing transportation. Participants were randomly assigned to either 
imagine this woman’s feelings (empathy condition) or not (control condition). Consistent 
with the cooperation results of the present study, Davis (1983b) found a significant 
interaction between EC and the empathy manipulation, such that EC was positively related to 
helping in the control condition, but was unrelated to helping in the empathy condition. Like 
the results of the current study, Davis’ (1983b) results suggest that individual differences in 
empathic concern moderate the impact of empathic perspective-taking instructions.  
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Compatible results were also obtained by Graziano and colleagues (2007) using a 
measure of agreeableness. Aggreeableness and empathic concern are highly correlated (e.g., 
Graziano et al. found a correlation of .53). Graziano et al. (2007) offered a Person X 
Situation perspective on aggreeableness, empathy, and helping. Across several studies, they 
found that empathic perspective-taking instructions increased interindividual helping among 
participants who were low, but not high in aggreeableness. Graziano et al.’s findings 
correspond with the present finding that the outgroup empathy perspective-taking exercise 
increased cooperation among participants who were low, but not high in empathic concern. 
Thus, the current results, like those of Davis (1983b) and Graziano et al. (2007), give 
credence to the Lewinian idea that behavior can best be understood by examining both the 
person and the situation.  
Gender differences in empathy. While the step 1 cooperation model revealed that the 
outgroup empathy exercise increased intergroup cooperation among male groups only, this 
gender difference was eliminated in step 2 when EC and EC interactions were included in the 
model. This suggests that although more men than women tend to be low in empathic 
concern, the outgroup empathy exercise was just as likely to increase cooperation among 
low-EC women as low-EC men. Conversely, an unexpected gender interaction did remain for 
competition versus withdrawal. The outgroup empathy exercise made male group members 
who were high in EC more likely to withdraw and less likely to compete with the outgroup 
(the reverse was true for men low in EC). It is unclear why the outgroup empathy 
manipulation was more influential for men than women. In fact, the manipulation checks 
revealed that women in the outgroup empathy condition were more likely than men to 
consider the outgroup’s feelings before making their PDG-Alt choices. However, such 
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consideration did not appear to influence women’s actual behavior. Thus, although women 
were quite capable of empathizing with the outgroup, outgroup empathy did not make them 
more likely to withdraw than compete. These findings indicate that the relationship between 
empathy and gender is more complex than has been described by previous research (cf. 
Eisenberg & Lennon, 1983), and points to the importance of the distinction among 
cooperative, withdrawal, and competitive responses for delineating the role of empathy in 
modifying intergroup conflict. 
The gender difference observed for competition versus withdrawal is particularly 
interesting in light of a prior finding by Davis (1983b). Davis (1983b) found that empathic 
perspective-taking instructions similar to the outgroup empathy exercise used in Experiment 
1 made women, but not men, more likely to help another individual. Together with the 
current results, this suggests that women might be more influenced by empathic feelings in 
interindividual contexts, but men might be more influenced by empathic feelings in 
intergroup contexts. It is possible that gender roles (Eagly & Crowley, 1986; Eagly & 
Steffen, 1986) compel women to act on their feelings of empathy in interindividual 
interactions, but do not require such actions in intergroup interactions. Why men would be 
more influenced by empathic perspective-taking in intergroup contexts is less clear. Perhaps 
female gender roles (Eagly & Crowley, 1986; Eagly & Steffen, 1986) encourage a relatively 
stronger orientation toward the ingroup than male gender roles, making them less responsive 
to empathic feelings toward the outgroup. In noncorrespondent situations like the PDG-Alt 
matrix (Kelley & Thibaut, 1978), women’s primary concern may be to help their ingroup, 
and this concern for the ingroup may override their feelings of concern for the outgroup. As I 
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did not have a priori predictions regarding gender differences in competition and withdrawal, 
the reliability of this difference should be verified by future research.   
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER III 
 
EXPERIMENT 2: EMPATHY AND INTERGROUP AGGRESSION 
In Experiment 2, I used the same empathy manipulation as in Experiment 1 in order 
to investigate similarities and differences in how empathy affects intergroup aggression 
versus intergroup conflict. Intergroup aggression refers to behaviors meant to harm another 
group (Meier & Hinsz, 2004; Struch & Schwartz, 1989). In Experiment 2, intergroup 
aggression was measured with the hot sauce paradigm (Lieberman, Solomon, Greenberg, & 
McGregor, 1999; McGregor, Lieberman, Greenberg, Solomon, Arndt, Simon, & 
Pyszczynski, 1998; Meier & Hinsz; 2004). The hot sauce paradigm requires provoking or 
angering participants and then providing them with an opportunity to aggress against a target 
by allocating spicy hot sauce to them (Lieberman et al., 1999). In some experiments, the 
provocation involves having participants drink a noxious juice sample purportedly prepared 
by the target (e.g., McGregor et al., 1998); in other experiments, the provocation involves 
showing participants a large amount of hot sauce (approximately 50 grams) and telling 
participants it was allocated to them by the target (Meier & Hinsz, 2004). Lieberman et al. 
(1999) argued for the ecological validity of using hot sauce to measure aggression by noting 
that spicy food has been used in both aggressive “real world acts” (e.g., by a cook at a 
Denny’s restaurant in New Hampshire) and media portrayals (e.g., by Robin Williams’ 
character in the film “Mrs. Doubtfire”). 
Few studies have compared intergroup conflict with intergroup aggression. Meier and 
Hinsz (2004) indirectly investigated this issue by extending research on interindividual-
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intergroup discontinuity to the realm of aggression. Interindividual-intergroup discontinuity 
refers to the finding that groups are more competitive than individuals in mixed-motive 
situations like the PDG (Wildschut et al., 2003). Meier and Hinsz (2004) found that groups 
are also more aggressive than individuals. Meier and Hinsz (2004) used the hot sauce 
paradigm (Lieberman et al., 1999; McGregor et al., 1998) to test whether groups would force 
other groups and individuals to eat more hot sauce than would individuals. They found that 
following a mild provocation (a) groups allocated more hot sauce than individuals; (b) more 
hot sauce was allocated to groups than to individuals; and (c) more hot sauce was allocated in 
intergroup interactions (i.e., group vs. group) than in interindividual interactions (i.e., 
individual vs. individual). In addition, they found that group-on-group interactions exhibited 
the most aggression, while one-on-one interactions exhibited the least aggression; group-on-
one and one-on-group interactions exhibited moderate aggression, and did not differ from 
each other.  
Wildschut, Insko, and Pinter (2007) found a similar pattern of results using the PDG. 
Wildschut et al. (2007) found that group-on-group interactions exhibited the most 
competition, while one-on-one interactions exhibited the least competition; group-on-one and 
one-on-group interactions exhibited moderate competition, and did not differ from each 
other. The compatibility of Meier and Hinsz’s (2004) aggression findings with Wildschut et 
al.’s (2007) competition findings might suggest that the same factors that affect conflict in 
prisoner’s dilemma situations might also affect aggression. However, there are important 
differences between conflict (i.e., competition versus cooperation) and aggression that call 
this assumption into question. 
  
30 
 
First, intergroup conflict, as modeled by the PDG is an interdependent situation in 
which outcomes for both sides are determined by the combination of decisions made by the 
two sides (Kelley et at., 2003; Kelley & Thibaut, 1978). Intergroup aggression, on the other 
hand, is a situation in which the outcomes for one side are unilaterally determined by the 
other side. Behaving aggressively toward another group will not influence one’s own group’s 
outcomes, unless, of course, there are multiple interactions between the two groups. Thus, 
intergroup aggression might be characterized as situation of “mutual partner control” (Kelley 
et al., 2003) or “mutual fate control” (Kelley & Thibaut, 1978) because each side’s own fate 
is completely determined by the other side. On the other hand, in prisoner’s dilemma 
situations each side has a degree of “actor control” (Kelley et al., 2003) or “reflexive control” 
(Kelley & Thibaut, 1978) over its own outcomes. Schopler and colleagues (Schopler, Insko, 
Wieselquist, Pemberton, Witcher, Kozar et al., 2001) did not find evidence of 
interindividual-intergroup discontinuity with a mutual fate control (MFC) matrix—neither 
groups nor individuals acted competitively in an MFC matrix. However, as discussed earlier, 
Meier and Hinsz (2004) did find evidence of interindividual-intergroup discontinuity using 
the hot sauce paradigm. The inconsistency between these two studies might be due to another 
important difference between conflict and aggression—the presence of provocation.  
As defined by Anderson and Bushman (1997, p. 29), provocation refers to “acts of 
harm committed by the target against the person whose aggressive behavior is eventually 
assessed.” Provocation is an important issue to consider because most research on conflict 
(e.g., research using the PDG; Wildschut et al., 2003) does not include provocation from the 
target whereas most research on aggression does (Anderson & Bushman, 1997; Berkowitz, 
1989; Bettencourt & Miller, 1996; Meier & Hinsz, 2004). Comparing Meier and Hinsz’s 
  
31 
 
(2004) aggression results to Schopler et al.’s (2001) MFC results raises the possibility that 
provocation might exacerbate the tendency for groups to be more aggressive than 
individuals. This possibility is not directly examined in the present research, but the question 
of how provocation affects intergroup relations is an important one that merits further 
investigation.  
To be consistent with prior research on intergroup aggression (Meier & Hinsz, 2004), 
the Experiment 2 procedure included provocation in order to investigate how empathy affects 
intergroup aggression. Specifically, Experiment 2 employed the procedure used by Meier and 
Hinsz (2004), in which, before making their hot sauce allocations, groups were shown a large 
amount of hot sauce (48.18 grams) and were told that this amount was allocated to them by 
the other group. As Experiment 1 did not include a provocation from the outgroup but 
Experiment 2 did, potential differences between the two studies might be due to the presence 
of a provocation from the target.  
In sum, while both intergroup conflict and intergroup aggression are similar in that 
they require groups to decide whether to act in ways that could potentially harm the 
outgroup, there are also important differences between conflict and aggression. These 
differences raise the question of whether empathy will affect intergroup aggression in 
Experiment 2 in a way similar to how it affected intergroup conflict in Experiment 1. 
Method 
Participants were 288 students (132 men, 156 women) enrolled in introductory 
psychology classes at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. The independent 
variables in this experiment were identical to those used in Experiment 1 except for two 
small changes. The wording of the empathy manipulation was modified to be consistent with 
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the hot sauce procedure, and a more recent version of the Test of Self-Conscious Affect was 
used (TOSCA-3; Tangney, Dearing, Wagner & Gramzow, 2000). 
Procedure  
Participants arrived at the laboratory in groups of six (all women or all men), and on 
arrival, were randomly assigned an identification number (1-6). Participants 1, 2, and 5 were 
escorted to a room on the left side of the suite, and participants 3, 4, and 6 were escorted to a 
room on the right side of the suite.  
Participants were informed that the experiment was an investigation of personality, 
taste preference, and interactions between groups. During the experiment they would fill out 
several personality questionnaires and would taste and give their impressions of a food 
sample. Participants were told that different foods were being examined, and that, in this 
experiment, they would taste and rate hot sauce. They were further instructed that the 
experimenters needed to remain blind to the specifics of the sample type and therefore they 
would be asked to select samples of hot sauce for others to consume. 
After receiving these instructions, participants completed a consent form, the IRI, and 
the TOSCA-3. To support the cover story that the study was about taste preferences, 
participants also filled out a general taste preference questionnaire (Lieberman et al., 1999; 
McGregor et al., 1998) in which they indicated how much they like foods that are sweet, 
crisp, creamy, salty, spicy, and tart (-3 = dislike extremely, 3 = like extremely). In addition, 
participants completed one copy of the information sheet used in Experiment 1 (see 
Appendix).  
Next, to support the provocation cover story that the other group had allocated a lot of 
hot sauce for their group to consume, the groups engaged in a short creativity task in which 
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they competed against each other. The task involved listing creative uses for a paperclip 
(Guilford, 1967). Groups had four minutes to complete this task. Following its completion, 
each side was told that they won and each person received a piece of candy as a prize. 
Telling each group that they had won the paperclip task introduced the possibility that the 
members of the other group were sore losers that would retaliate by allocating a large portion 
of hot sauce.  
Hot sauce allocation task. Following the paperclip task, all participants were asked to 
consume a small portion of hot sauce, so that they understood that the sauce they would be 
allocating was hot and potentially painful. For the hot sauce tasting, the experimenter gave 
each participant a popsicle stick and brought a cup with hot sauce to each group’s room. The 
experimenter recited the following instructions: 
We would now like everyone to sample a small portion of the hot sauce so that you 
understand what it tastes like. I would like each of you to take one of these sticks and 
dip it into the cup of hot sauce so you can sample it. Please dip your stick into the hot 
sauce until it touches the bottom of the cup. This is just so everyone tastes the same 
amount. Water is available for each of you if you desire.  
 
The hot sauce was made following Lieberman et al.’s (1999) instructions, which 
required mixing five parts Heinz chili sauce with three parts Tapatio salsa picante to make a 
sufficiently hot and evenly consistent sauce. After tasting the hot sauce, all participants were 
asked several questions about the hot sauce: (a) How hot was the sauce you just tasted? (0 = 
not at all hot; 6 = extremely hot); (b) How painful do you think it would be to eat a 
tablespoon of this sauce? (0 = not at all painful; 6 =extremely painful); (c) How much did 
you like the sauce that you just tasted? (-3 = extremely dislike; 3 = extremely like); (d) How 
much do you like hot sauce in general? (-3 = extremely dislike; 3 = extremely like).  
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After answering these questions, participants were instructed that to make the 
experiment run faster, and because the experimenters needed to remain blind to certain 
specifics about the food type, each group would be asked to select the amount of hot sauce 
for the other group to consume. The experimenter then handed each participant a written 
copy of the following instructions, and read these instructions aloud: 
In a few moments, each group will be asked to allocate a portion of hot sauce for the 
other group to consume. To allocate the hot sauce, your group will take a container of 
hot sauce and use a plastic spoon to put a portion of hot sauce into a plastic cup that I 
will hand out in a few moments. You can take as much time as needed and you can 
give as little or as much hot sauce as you see fit, but remember that all the hot sauce 
you allocate will be consumed by the other group. Also, please make sure that the 
members of your group agree about the amount of hot sauce to allocate. The amount 
of hot sauce that you allocate should reflect your group’s collective opinion. The 
amount of hot sauce that you allocate will be the amount each individual group 
member must consume.  
 
We realize that this is a lot of information. To be sure that you fully understand the 
hot sauce allocation procedure, we would like for each of you to engage in a brief 
writing exercise. This writing exercise is to be completed by each of you individually, 
and should take approximately 10 minutes to complete. Please do not discuss the 
contents of this writing exercise with the other members of your group. Following 
this writing exercise, I will give each group a plastic cup in order to allocate the hot 
sauce. 
 
Participants were informed that both groups would get chips to eat with the hot sauce, 
and to support this cover story, a bag of tortilla chips was placed on the table in each group’s 
room.  
Before completing the writing exercise, participants were given an opportunity to get 
to know the members of the other group. The experimenter gave each group a folder 
containing the information sheets ostensibly completed by the other group. The purpose of 
including these information sheets was two-fold. First, as in Experiment 1, the information 
sheets supported the empathy manipulation by facilitating acquaintanceship among the 
participants. Second, the information sheets supported the provocation cover story that the 
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other group had allocated a lot of hot sauce for their group to consume. The bogus 
information sheets used in Experiment 2 were different than those used previously. In 
Experiment 2, participants read that one member of the other group was competitive and 
enjoyed poker, and another member was intense and enjoyed martial arts (see Appendix). In 
pilot testing, participants did not complete nor receive these information sheets. However, in 
these pilot sessions, there was a high degree of suspicion regarding whether the other group 
had actually allocated such a large amount of hot sauce for them to consume. Including these 
sheets seemed to allay some of the suspicion associated with the provocation cover story. 
 After giving each group a moment to read over the information sheets, the 
experimenter had participants move to individual rooms in the suite, and handed each 
participant an empathy writing exercise. 
Empathy manipulation. As in Experiment 1, the empathy manipulation was based on 
instructions used by Batson and colleagues (Batson et al., 2003; Batson & Ahmad, 2001; 
Batson & Moran, 1999; see also T. R. Cohen, et al., 2006). Participants in the outgroup 
empathy condition received these instructions. 
In this exercise we would like for you to imagine how the members of the other group 
feel about the hot sauce allocation task. That is, imagine how the members of the 
other group are likely to feel while considering how much hot sauce to allocate. 
Imagine also how the members of the other group will feel while waiting to find out 
how much hot sauce their group must consume. Imagine how the members of the 
other group will feel when they receive the hot sauce. Take about one minute for this 
imagination exercise, getting as clear a sense as possible of how the members of the 
other group likely feel. Then, at the end of the minute, write down what you imagined. 
We have found that carefully following this procedure can ensure understanding of 
the upcoming task. 
 
Participants in the ingroup empathy condition received the same instructions except 
the phrase “your own group” was substituted for the phrase “the other group.” Participants in 
the objective condition received instructions that asked them to remain objective: 
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In this exercise we would like for you to think about the upcoming hot sauce 
allocation task. While thinking about the upcoming task, try to take an objective 
perspective. That is, try not to get caught up in how the other participants in today’s 
study feel; just remain objective and detached. Take about one minute for this thought 
exercise, getting as clear a sense as possible of the upcoming hot sauce allocation 
task. Then, at the end of the minute, write down what you thought about. We have 
found that carefully following this procedure can ensure understanding of the 
upcoming task. 
 
Hot sauce allocation and provocation. Participants were given approximately 10 
minutes to work on the empathy writing exercise. Following completion of the exercise, the 
experimenter collected the exercises and had participants return to their group’s home room. 
The experimenter then stated that one group would be randomly chosen to allocate first, and 
one would allocate second. The experimenter asked each group to draw a piece of paper to 
determine the order. Each group drew a piece of paper that stated, “Your group will allocate 
second.” At this time, the experiment asked each group to close the door to their room and 
await further instructions.  
The experimenter waited for three minutes so participants believed the experimenter 
was entering the other group’s room and collecting the hot sauce that they allocated. After 
three minutes, the experimenter entered each group’s room and placed a nine-ounce cup 
containing 48.18g of hot sauce (1 SD above the mean amount allocated in McGregor et al., 
1998; cf. Meier & Hinsz, 2004) onto the table and told the group:  
The other group allocated first. They allocated this much hot sauce for each of you to 
consume. You will receive chips to eat with the hot sauce. At this time, I would like 
your group to allocate a portion of hot sauce for the other group to consume. The 
amount of hot sauce that you allocate will be the amount each individual group 
member must consume. I will take the cup of hot sauce with the amount that each of 
you will consume out of the room so it does not get spilled. After you are done with 
your allocation, I will bring your group three cups of this amount of hot sauce with 
some chips. When you are finished with your allocation, please slide this blue sheet 
of paper under the door and wait for me to return. 
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At this point, the experimenter left the room and waited for each group to place the 
blue sheet under the door. The bogus amount of hot sauce was shown to the participants to 
induce mild provocation (Meier & Hinsz, 2004). After the hot sauce allocations were 
collected, each participant was given a questionnaire with supplementary dependent 
measures and questions designed to probe for suspicion. Following the completion of the 
questionnaires, participants were fully debriefed and dismissed. No participant was forced to 
consume hot sauce. 
Dependent Variables 
Hot Sauce. The key dependent variable was how much hot sauce groups allocated. 
Hot allocation was measured in grams (.01 increments) using a Mettler Toledo digital scale 
(model number PL601-S). 
Empathy manipulation check. As in Experiment 1, the content of the writing exercise 
was coded to assess the effectiveness of the empathy manipulation. Two independent raters 
coded for whether the participant thought about either group (ingroup thoughts, κ = .94; 
outgroup thoughts, κ = .95), and whether the participant discussed the feelings of either 
group (ingroup feelings, κ = .95; outgroup feelings, κ = .99). The judges’ ratings were 
averaged to form indices of these manipulation checks. Each index ranged from 0 (did not 
mention thoughts / feelings) to 1 (mentioned thoughts / feelings). 
Probing for Suspicion by Analyzing Reasons for Hot Sauce Allocation 
Following the hot sauce allocation, each group member was asked why their group 
allocated the amount that they did: “Your group was given the opportunity to allocate hot 
sauce for the other group to consume. Think about how much your group allocated and tell 
us why your group allocated that amount.” I probed for suspicion about the procedure by 
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examining responses to this question. Most group members gave responses that matched 
their allocations and did not indicate suspicion about the hot sauce procedure. For example, a 
group that allocated 138 grams of hot sauce answered:  
We allocated a lot of hot sauce to each of them because we were going second and 
they had just allocated a lot to us (way more than we wanted). So we got to allocate a 
disgusting amount without worrying what they would do to us.  
 
A group that only allocated 27 grams of hot sauce responded, “We allocated two 
spoonfuls since it was a little less than what the other group allocated to us. We didn't want to 
‘torture’ them with too much, so we tried to give a very small amount.”  
Three groups responded to the question by expressing a high degree of suspicion 
about the experiment. These groups explicitly stated that they did not believe that the other 
group would have to eat the hot sauce allocated to them. For example, one suspicious group 
member wrote: 
Honestly, because I do not for a second believe that the other group will receive the 
amount that will be allocated by us. I suspect that most of the procedure in this lab 
have been manipulations of me and in turn, have manipulated my reactions. 
 
 Each of the suspicious groups filled their entire cup (approximately 200g). These 
groups were excluded from all analyses. After excluding the three suspicious groups, the 
final sample contained 93 three-person groups (279 participants). 
Data Analysis 
Linear regression was used to investigate how the empathy manipulation, gender, EC, 
and guilt influenced the amount of hot sauce allocated. As in Experiment 1, the empathy 
manipulation was partitioned into two planned orthogonal contrasts: (a) outgroup empathy 
versus objective; (b) ingroup empathy versus outgroup empathy and objective combined. The 
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unit of analysis was the group. Group members’ responses were averaged to form group-
level data.  
The analyses were conducted in two steps. The first step included the empathy 
manipulation contrasts and gender. In the second step, I added EC and guilt, along with the 
two- and three-way interactions. As in Experiment 1, in preliminary analyses, I also included 
PT and shame in the model, but there were no significant effects for these variables so I do 
not discuss them further.  
Results 
Hot Sauce Ratings 
If hot sauce allocations are to be used as a measure of aggression, it is imperative that 
participants think the hot sauce is painful. An inspection of the mean hot sauce ratings 
revealed that male groups liked the hot sauce and did not think it was very painful (see Table 
6). While female groups did not think the hot sauce was extremely painful, their average pain 
rating was slightly above the midpoint of the scale, indicating that they felt it would be at 
least moderately painful to eat a tablespoon of the hot sauce. The hot sauce recipe used in 
Experiment 2 was identical to the recipe used by Lieberman et al. (1999). Lieberman et al. 
indicate that their participants (undergraduates at the University of Arizona) found the sauce 
to be quite hot and painful. It is possible that undergraduates at the University of North 
Carolina had different thresholds for the painfulness of hot sauce than undergraduates at the 
University of Arizona. Alternatively, it is also possible that the relatively low ratings of 
hotness and painfulness observed in the current study were due to the fact that the hot sauce 
rating scale used in Experiment 2 differed from Lieberman et al.’s (1999) rating scale.  
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To account for the fact that the hot sauce was not as painful as intended (especially 
for male groups), the pain rating (“How painful do you think it would be to eat a tablespoon 
of this sauce?”) was mean centered and included as a covariate in all statistical analyses. 
Interactions with the pain rating were also included in the analyses.  
Empathy Manipulation Check 
Table 7 shows the results for the empathy manipulation check. As expected, 
participants in the ingroup empathy condition thought about and discussed the feelings of 
their ingroup more than participants in the other conditions. Likewise, participants in the 
outgroup empathy condition thought about and discussed the feelings of the outgroup more 
than participants in the other conditions. 
Hot Sauce Allocations 
Table 8 presents the hot sauce allocations by the empathy manipulation and gender. 
Male groups in the objective condition allocated, on average, 84.30 grams of hot sauce, 
which is very similar to the average allocation of 92.87 grams made by male groups in Meier 
and Hinsz (2004) study (Meier and Hinsz’s study did not include female participants). Thus 
the allocations made by male groups in the control condition of Experiment 2 replicate prior 
results and offer support for the reliability of the hot sauce procedure for measuring 
intergroup aggression.  
Differences between the empathy conditions were investigated with linear regression. 
Table 9 presents the linear regression results of the step 1 model. As shown in Table 9, there 
were two significant effects: (a) Gender X Ingroup Empathy, and (b) Pain Rating X 
Outgroup Empathy.  
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Gender X Ingroup Empathy. The Gender X Ingroup Empathy interaction was 
significant, B = 36.62, SE = 12.28, p = .004. Probing this interaction (Preacher et al., 2006) 
revealed that female groups in the ingroup empathy condition allocated significantly more 
hot sauce than female groups in the other conditions, t(81) = 2.90, p = .005 (see Table 8); 
male groups in the ingroup empathy condition did not significantly differ from those in the 
other conditions, t(81) = -1.41, p = .16. 
Pain Rating X Outgroup Empathy. The interaction between the pain rating and the 
outgroup empathy manipulation was significant, B = 19.54, SE = 9.51, p = .04, and is shown 
in Figure 5. Whereas greater pain ratings were associated with marginally more aggression in 
the outgroup empathy condition, B = 19.57, SE = 11.20, p = .08, there was a nonsignificant 
tendency for greater pain ratings to be associated with less aggression in the objective 
condition, B = -19.49, SE = 12.99, p = .14. Probing this interaction (Preacher et al., 2006) 
revealed that groups in the outgroup empathy condition gave less than those in the objective 
condition if they did not think the hot sauce was at all painful t(81) = -2.22, p = .03, but gave 
marginally more than those in the objective condition if they thought the hot sauce was 
extremely painful, t(81) = 1.82, p = .07.  
The step 2 model that included EC, guilt, and the corresponding interaction terms did 
not reveal any significant effects beyond those that were significant in step 1. Both the 
Gender X Ingroup Empathy interaction and the Pain Rating X Outgroup Empathy interaction 
remained significant after EC and guilt and the EC and guilt interactions were entered into 
the regression model.  
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Discussion 
The goal of Experiment 2 was to investigate how ingroup and outgroup empathy 
affect intergroup aggression. Hot sauce allocations were used to measure intergroup 
aggression (Lieberman et al., 1999; McGregor et al., 1998; Meier & Hinsz, 2004). I found a 
significant interaction between the hot sauce painfulness rating and the outgroup empathy 
versus objective contrast. As shown in Figure 5, groups in the outgroup empathy condition 
who thought the hot sauce was painful allocated more than those in the objective condition, 
but groups in the outgroup empathy condition who did not think the sauce was painful 
allocated less than those in the objective condition. Thus, the same empathic perspective-
taking exercise that caused group members low in empathic concern to cooperate in the 
PDG-Alt matrix (Experiment 1) caused groups who thought the hot sauce was painful to be 
aggressive in the hot sauce allocation task (Experiment 2). Why did the same instructions 
yield such different effects in the two experiments? The significant interaction between the 
outgroup empathy instructions and the pain rating points to the important role of provocation 
in determining whether outgroup empathy will foster positive versus negative intergroup 
relations.  
Groups who did not think the hot sauce was painful would not have felt provoked by 
receiving a large amount to eat. Accordingly, among these groups the outgroup empathy 
exercise decreased aggression (i.e., made groups allocate less hot sauce). Reasons given by 
these groups suggest that in the absence of a perceived provocation, considering the feelings 
of outgroup members might motivate fairness and reciprocity. For example, a participant in 
the outgroup empathy condition who did not think the hot sauce was painful wrote: “We 
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allocated the same amount as them. It seemed fair.” This group allocated 47 grams of hot 
sauce.  
On the contrary, receiving a large amount of hot sauce would have been regarded as 
very provocative by groups who thought the sauce was painful. For these groups, the 
outgroup empathy exercise increased aggression (i.e., made them allocate more hot sauce). 
Reasons given by these groups suggest that the outgroup empathy exercise may have 
increased their desire for retaliation against the outgroup. For example, a participant in the 
outgroup empathy condition who thought the hot sauce was quite painful wrote: “We gave 
the other group more because they gave us quite a bit to begin with. We decided to ‘punish’ 
them for giving us so much; so we gave them more.” This group allocated 113 grams of hot 
sauce.  
While provocation from an outgroup seems to undermine the effectiveness of 
outgroup empathy in fostering positive intergroup relations, provocation does not seem to 
influence how ingroup empathy affects intergroup relations. Regardless of the perceived 
painfulness of the hot sauce, female groups in the ingroup empathy condition allocated 
significantly more than female groups in the other conditions (see Table 8). Thus, the same 
exercise that caused guilt-prone group members to act uncooperatively in the PDG-Alt 
matrix also caused female groups to act aggressively in the hot sauce allocation task. Reasons 
provided by the female groups suggest that a desire for retaliation may have motivated their 
aggression. For example, a woman in the ingroup empathy condition indicated that her group 
allocated a lot of hot sauce in order to “fight back”: “We allocated a pretty large amount 
because the other group gave us so much. We were a little surprised at how much they gave 
us and decided to ‘fight back.’” This woman’s group allocated 112 grams. Compare this 
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response to one given by a woman in the objective condition, whose group only allocated 20 
grams: “We didn't want the other group to have to eat as much hot sauce, so we gave them 
less than they gave us.  We decided to be nice rather than seek revenge and give them more.”  
It is interesting that considering the feelings of ingroup members made female groups 
behave aggressively, but did not do so for male groups. One possible explanation for this 
finding relates to gender differences in social roles (Eagly & Crowley, 1986; Eagly & 
Steffen, 1986). As discussed earlier, female gender roles may encourage a relatively stronger 
orientation toward the ingroup than male gender roles. This greater orientation toward the 
ingroup might compel women to act on their empathic feelings for ingroup members and 
retaliate against outgroups who harm their group. 
Another possible explanation for the observed Gender X Ingroup Empathy interaction 
relates to gender differences in moral orientation (Gilligan, 1982; Jafee & Hyde, 2000). 
Gilligan (1982) proposed that when considering the appropriateness of a given behavior, 
women tend to be more “care oriented” (i.e., focused on maintaining relationships and 
responding to the needs of others), while men tend to be more “justice oriented” (i.e., focused 
on principles of equity and fairness). While Gilligan and others (e.g., Jaffee & Hyde, 2000) 
acknowledge that men and women use both care and justice reasoning, meta-analytic 
evidence suggests that there is a small tendency for women to be relatively more care 
oriented than men (Jaffee & Hyde, 2000). If women's moral reasoning is relatively more 
focused on maintaining relationships and responding to the needs of others, it follows that 
they might be more likely to behave aggressively toward an outgroup that has hurt their 
group if they are asked to explicitly consider the feelings of those in their ingroup. Thus, the 
  
45 
 
ingroup empathy exercise may have amplified women’s care orientations (Gilligan, 1982), 
making them more likely to act aggressively in response to provocation from the outgroup. 
Unlike in Experiment 1, empathic concern and guilt did not moderate the effects of 
the empathy manipulation in Experiment 2. One key difference between the experiments was 
that in Experiment 2, group members were seated in the same room and made a collective 
group decision based on group discussion. In Experiment 1, group members were seated in 
their own rooms and did not communicate with fellow ingroup members. Instead, 
participants in Experiment 1 cast an anonymous vote for the decision they wanted their group 
to make. Personality characteristics of individual group members might be less likely to 
influence intergroup interactions when group decisions are made collectively through 
discussion. A similar idea was proposed by Meier, Hinsz, and Heimerdinger (2007) in their 
review of aggression involving groups. They suggested that “strong group situations may 
overwhelm the influence of individual differences” (Meier et al., 2007, p. 308). There were, 
of course, a number of other differences between Experiments 1 and 2, so this interpretation 
of the present results should be regarded as tentative. Nonetheless, the idea that personality 
characteristics are more or less influential in different contexts is an interesting possibility 
that should be explored by future research.  
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER IV 
 
GENERAL DISCUSSION 
How does feeling empathy or concern for others affect intergroup relations? The 
present research indicates that the answer is more complex than many might suspect. While it 
has been suggested that feeling empathy for outgroup members fosters positive intergroup 
relations (Stephan & Finlay, 1999), the current findings revealed that this statement does not 
universally hold true. The presence of provocation from an outgroup might represent an 
important boundary condition regarding when the consideration of outgroup members’ 
feelings will promote positive versus negative intergroup relations. In Experiment 1, I found 
that the consideration of outgroup members’ feelings caused groups composed of individuals 
low in dispositional empathic concern to behave cooperatively, but in Experiment 2, I found 
a very different pattern of results. In Experiment 2, I found that the consideration of outgroup 
members’ feelings caused groups who thought the hot sauce was painful to act aggressively, 
but caused groups who did not think the hot sauce was painful to act benevolently. Taken 
together, the results of the two studies suggest that in the absence of provocation from an 
outgroup, feeling empathy for outgroup members will promote positive intergroup relations 
(e.g., more cooperative, less aggressive behavior), but in the presence of provocation from an 
outgroup, feeling empathy for outgroup members will promote negative intergroup relations 
(e.g., less cooperative, more aggressive behavior). Note, however, that provocation was not 
directly manipulated in either study; so while the results are consistent with this conclusion, 
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they do not provide definitive evidence that provocation accounted for the differences 
between how outgroup empathy affected cooperation and aggression. 
Knowing that provocation from an outgroup may cause outgroup empathy 
interventions to exacerbate instead of attenuate intergroup hostilities has important 
implications for intergroup relations programs. As pointed out by Stephan and Finlay (1999), 
many intergroup relations programs attempt to promote positive intergroup relations by 
fostering empathy between rival groups. Often, however, these programs are ineffective 
because they are created without full understanding of the complexity of the relationship 
between empathy and intergroup behavior. Stephan and Finlay (1999) provided several 
recommendations for the use of empathy in intergroup relations programs, but their 
suggestions did not include a discussion of provocation. Thus, the present findings suggest an 
important addendum to Stephan and Finlay’s (1999) guidelines: Intergroup relations trainers, 
facilitators, and educators should be aware that fostering empathy for outgroups can backfire 
if the outgroup acts in a hostile manner. In the context of a hostile provocation, outgroup 
empathy interventions are likely to increase retaliation rather than forgiveness. 
Feeling empathy for ingroup members is likely to foster negative intergroup relations 
regardless of whether provocation is present. In Experiment 1, I found that the consideration 
of ingroup members’ feelings caused groups high in guilt proneness to behave 
uncooperatively toward the outgroup, and in Experiment 2, I found that consideration of 
ingroup members’ feelings caused female groups to behave aggressively toward the 
outgroup. While these results do not indicate that ingroup empathy will foster negative 
intergroup relations among all group members, they do suggest that, at least for some 
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individuals, feeling concern and compassion for those in their ingroup will lead to negative 
behaviors toward outgroups.  
The present research builds on and extends the work of Davis (1983b) and Graziano 
et al. (2007) by exploring when personality will interact with situational manipulations of 
empathy to influence behavior. While unanswered questions remain regarding exactly when 
gender and individual differences will moderate the impact of empathic perspective-taking 
instructions, the current research represents an important step forward in the exploration of 
this issue. Future research should continue to investigate when gender and personality factors 
(e.g., empathic concern, guilt proneness) will be influential in determining how empathy 
affects intergroup relations. Investigating this issue is important for determining when and 
for whom empathy interventions will be most successful.  
Future research should also continue to investigate how provocation affects 
intergroup relations. Whereas the current results suggest that provocation may hinder the 
effectiveness of outgroup empathy in fostering positive intergroup relations, the present 
research did not test this proposition directly. Future studies should manipulate provocation 
to determine whether it does, in fact, explain the observed differences in how outgroup 
empathy affected behavior in the PDG-Alt versus the hot sauce task. 
Conclusion 
Philosophers, scientists, and scholars have long argued for the importance of empathy 
in promoting moral behavior. While empathy may, indeed, promote moral behavior in certain 
circumstances, the present research suggests that this might not always be the case. Those 
who wish to use empathy to improve intergroup relations should be mindful of the important 
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role of provocation in determining whether fostering empathy for outgroup members will 
promote positive versus negative intergroup relations. 
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APPENDIX 
Information Sheet – Experiment 1 
Bogus information given in italics. 
Participant #____ 1, 2, 3, 4, or 5 (assume actual participant is 6) 
What is your favorite color?  1) Blue; 2) Red; 3) Green; 4) Navy Blue; 5) Yellow 
List two adjectives that describe you.  
1) Friendly & Energetic; 2) Intelligent & Outgoing; 3) Spontaneous & Athletic;  
4) Funny & Nice; 5) Happy & Easygoing 
What is your favorite food?  
1) Pizza; 2) Ice Cream; 3) Sushi; 4) Grilled Chicken; 5) Lasagna 
List two hobbies or interests.  
1) Music & Traveling; 2) Movies & Concerts; 3) Basketball & Reading;  
4) Swimming & Art; 5) Tennis & Sleeping 
What is your favorite season? 1) Fall; 2) Summer; 3) Winter; 4) Summer; 5) Spring 
 
Information Sheet – Experiment 2 
Bogus information given in italics. 
Participant #____ 1, 2, 5 (assume actual participant is in Group B: 3, 4, or 6) 
What is your favorite color? 1) Red; 2) Green; 5) Blue 
List two adjectives that describe you.  
1) Competitive & Athletic; 2) Determined & Intense; 5) Confident & Outgoing  
What is your favorite food? 1) Pizza; 2) Grilled Chicken; 5) Ice Cream 
List two hobbies or interests.  
1) Poker & Basketball; 2) Martial Arts & Fencing; 5) Traveling & Concerts    
What is your favorite season? 1) Fall; 2) Spring; 5) Summer   
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Table 1 
Experiment 1: Empathy Manipulation Check 
 
 Ingroup 
Empathy 
Outgroup 
Empathy 
Objective 
Perspective 
Ingroup Thoughts1,2 
Men      1.00 (.00) .14 (.28) .23 (.36) 
Women .99 (.08) .23 (.37) .21 (.35) 
Ingroup Feelings3,4 
Men .76 (.35) .04 (.18) .01 (.08) 
Women .83 (.33) .11 (.28) .02 (.13) 
Outgroup Thoughts5,6 
Men .10 (.23) 1.00 (.00) .18 (.35) 
Women .13 (.27) .98 (.11) .14 (.30) 
Outgroup Feelings7,8,9 
Men .03 (.17) .58 (.42) .01 (.08) 
Women .03 (.14) .91 (.25) .02 (.13) 
Note. N = 356. The table presents means (with standard deviations) of raters’ codings (1 = 
mentioned thoughts / feelings; 0 = did not mention thoughts / feelings). 
1 Ingroup Empathy vs. Other Conditions: F(1, 350) = 513.16, p < .001 
2 Outgroup Empathy vs. Objective: F(1, 350) = .82, p = .37 
3 Ingroup Empathy vs. Other Conditions: F(1, 350) = 587.85, p < .001   
4 Outgroup Empathy vs. Objective: F(1, 350) = 3.09, p = .08 
5 Outgroup Empathy vs. Other Conditions: F(1, 350) = 824.22, p < .001   
6 Ingroup Empathy vs. Objective: F(1, 350) = 2.02, p = .16. 
7 Outgroup Empathy vs. Other Conditions: F(1, 350) = 804.37, p < .001   
8 Ingroup Empathy vs. Objective: F(1, 350) = .20, p = .65 
9 Gender: F(1, 350) = 21.87, p < .001 
10 Gender X Outgroup Empathy vs. Other Conditions: F(1, 350) = 39.64, p < .001  
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Table 2 
Experiment 1: PDG-Alt Choice Means by Empathy Manipulation and Gender 
Empathy Condition 
 
Cooperation 
(X) 
Withdrawal 
(Y) 
Competition 
(Z) 
Outgroup Empathy 
Men  .33 (.48) .39 (.49) .28 (.45) 
Women  .18 (.39) .54 (.50) .28 (.45) 
Ingroup Empathy 
Men  .14 (.35) .53 (.51) .33 (.48) 
Women  .14 (.35) .58 (.50) .28 (.45) 
Objective Perspective 
Men  .12 (.33) .59 (.50) .29 (.46) 
Women  .21 (.41) .56 (.50) .23 (.43) 
Note. N = 356. Values represent choice means (with standard deviations). Means for each 
row total 1.00. Choice means are equivalent to the proportion of participants in each cell 
making that PDG-Alt choice.  
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Table 3 
Experiment 1: Logistic Regression of PDG-Alt Choice as a Function of Empathy 
Manipulation and Gender  
Variable Cooperation 
Competition vs. 
Withdrawal 
Outgroup Empathy vs. Objective    .64 (.30)*  .18 (.27) 
Ingroup Empathy vs. Other Conditions -.33 (.38)  .04 (.31) 
Gender  -.05 (.31) -.26 (.27) 
Gender X Outgroup Empathy   -.73 (.36)* -.08 (.33) 
Gender X Ingroup Empathy  .09 (.45) -.01 (.37) 
Note. N = 356. Unstandardized regression coefficients (with standard errors) from logistic 
regression analyses are presented. All tests have 1 df.  
* p < .05  
  
54 
 
Table 4 
Experiment 1: PDG-Alt Choice Means by Empathy Manipulation, Gender,  
Empathic Concern, and Guilt 
  Cooperation (X) Withdrawal (Y) Competition (Z) 
  Men Women Men Women Men Women 
Outgroup 
Empathy 
Low EC .36 .19 .28 .46 .36 .35 
High EC .27 .17 .64 .61 .09 .22 
Low Guilt  .30 .15 .41 .53 .30 .32 
High Guilt .44 .20 .33 .55 .22 .25 
Ingroup 
Empathy  
Low EC .16 .12 .52 .59 .32 .29 
High EC .09 .16 .55 .57 .36 .27 
Low Guilt  .17 .19 .52 .59 .30 .22 
High Guilt .08 .11 .54 .57 .38 .33 
Objective 
Perspective 
Low EC .10 .19 .65 .42 .26 .38 
High EC .20 .22 .40 .63 .40 .16 
Low Guilt  .14 .19 .60 .54 .26 .27 
High Guilt .00 .23 .50 .58 .50 .20 
Note. N = 356. Values represent choice means (or proportion of participants making that 
choice). While regression analyses used continuous EC and Guilt assessments, for 
illustrative purposes, EC and Guilt were dichotomized here. Participants with EC scores 
at the median or below were categorized as Low EC, while those with scores above the 
median were categorized as High EC. Participants with Guilt scores at the median or 
below were categorized as Low Guilt, while those with scores above the median were 
categorized as High Guilt. 
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Table 5 
Experiment 1: Logistic Regression of PDG-Alt Choice as a Function of  
Empathy Manipulation, Gender, Empathic Concern, and Guilt 
Variable Cooperation 
Competition vs. 
Withdrawal 
Outgroup Empathy vs. Objective  .49 (.33) -.03 (.40) 
Ingroup Empathy vs. Other Conditions -.61 (.43)  .04 (.39) 
Gender -.16 (.37) -.10 (.35) 
Empathic Concern (EC)  .39 (.33) -.70 (.38) 
Guilt -.33 (.32)  .51 (.40) 
Gender X Outgroup Empathy -.42 (.43)  .10 (.45) 
Gender X Ingroup Empathy  .49 (.53) -.12 (.45) 
EC X Outgroup Empathy   -.56 (.23)*  -1.25 (.53)* 
EC X Ingroup Empathy  .24 (.29)  .14 (.46) 
EC X Gender -.06 (.40)  .40 (.43) 
Guilt X Outgroup Empathy  .19 (.22)  .82 (.55) 
Guilt X Ingroup Empathy   -.59 (.29)*  .02 (.49) 
Guilt X Gender  .23 (.40) -.57 (.45) 
Gender X EC X Outgroup Empathy    1.36 (.59)* 
Gender X EC X Ingroup Empathy   .38 (.54) 
Gender X Guilt X Outgroup Empathy  -.69 (.60) 
Gender X Guilt X Ingroup Empathy   .01 (.57) 
Note. N = 356. Unstandardized regression coefficients (with standard errors) from logistic 
regression analyses are presented. All tests have 1 df. For cooperation, three-way interactions 
were also tested, but none were significant, so they were trimmed from the cooperation 
model (cf. J. Cohen, Cohen, Aiken, & West, 2003).  
* p < .05  
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Table 6 
Experiment 2: Means of Hot Sauce Ratings 
Question Men Women 
How hot was the sauce you just tasted? 1  
(0 = not at all hot; 6 = extremely hot) 
2.92 (.70) 3.55 (.93) 
How painful do you think it would be to eat a tablespoon of this 
sauce? 2 (0 = not at all painful; 6 = extremely painful) 
2.82 (.81) 3.65 (1.05) 
How much did you like the sauce that you just tasted? 3 
(-3 = dislike extremely; 3 = like extremely) 
1.12 (.72) .31 (1.15) 
How much do you like hot sauce in general? 4 
(-3 = dislike extremely; 3 = like extremely) 
1.19 (.87) .31 (1.19) 
How much do you like foods that are spicy? 5 
(-3 = dislike extremely; 3 = like extremely) 
1.51 (.82) .62 (1.04) 
Note. N = 93 groups. Values represent the means for the hot sauce ratings (with standard 
deviations).  
1 Women vs. Men: F(1, 91) = 13.08, p < .001   
2 Women vs. Men: F(1, 91) = 17.81, p < .001   
3 Women vs. Men: F(1, 91) = 15.64, p < .001   
4 Women vs. Men: F(1, 91) = 16.07, p < .001   
5 Women vs. Men: F(1, 91) = 20.48, p < .001   
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Table 7 
Experiment 2: Empathy Manipulation Check 
 
 Ingroup 
Empathy 
Outgroup 
Empathy 
Objective 
Perspective 
Ingroup Thoughts1,2 
Men .99 (.05) .25 (.35) .31 (.33) 
Women .98 (.09) .11 (.15) .28 (.33) 
Ingroup Feelings3,4 
Men .93 (.17) .13 (.20) .04 (.07) 
Women .96 (.12) .04 (.11) .00 (.00) 
Outgroup Thoughts5,6 
Men .32 (.29) .98 (.08) .48 (.36) 
Women .36 (.34) .98 (.05) .53 (.36) 
Outgroup Feelings7,8 
Men .03 (.10) .91 (.15) .07 (.14) 
Women .02 (.09) .94 (.13) .05 (.14) 
Note. N = 93 groups. The table presents means (with standard deviations) of raters’ codings 
(1 = mentioned thoughts / feelings; 0 = did not mention thoughts / feelings). 
1 Ingroup Empathy vs. Other Conditions: F(1, 87) = 160.99, p < .001 
2 Outgroup Empathy vs. Objective: F(1, 87) = 3.20, p = .08 
3 Ingroup Empathy vs. Other Conditions: F(1, 87) = 980.07, p < .001 
4 Outgroup Empathy vs. Objective: F(1, 87) = 4.22, p = .04. 
5 Outgroup Empathy vs. Other Conditions: F(1, 87) = 87.44, p < .001 
6 Ingroup Empathy vs. Objective: F(1, 87) = 5.09, p = .03 
7 Outgroup Empathy vs. Other Conditions: F(1, 87) = 1036.18, p < .001 
8 Ingroup Empathy vs. Objective: F(1, 87) = 1.03, p = .31
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Table 8 
Experiment 2: Hot Sauce Allocation Means by Empathy Manipulation and Gender 
Empathy Condition  Hot Sauce 
Outgroup Empathy 
Men 71.58 (33.27) 
Women 53.15 (23.00) 
Ingroup Empathy 
Men 59.65 (32.37) 
Women 77.77 (38.84) 
Objective Perspective 
Men  84.30 (49.07) 
Women  50.96 (45.69) 
Note. N = 93 groups. Values represent the mean amount of hot sauce in grams (with standard 
deviations). Before allocating, each group learned that the other group allocated 48.18g of 
hot sauce for each of them to consume. 
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Table 9 
Experiment 2: Linear Regression of Hot Sauce Allocations as a Function of  
Empathy Manipulation and Gender 
Variable  
Outgroup Empathy vs. Objective         5.63 (8.83) 
Ingroup Empathy vs. Other Conditions     -12.97 (9.18) 
Gender       -6.79 (8.80) 
Pain Rating (Centered)          .04 (7.79) 
Gender X Outgroup Empathy     -6.33 (10.92) 
Gender X Ingroup Empathy    36.62 (12.28)* 
Pain Rating X Outgroup Empathy      19.54 (9.51)* 
Pain Rating X Ingroup Empathy      1.01 (10.31) 
Gender X Pain Rating X Outgroup Empathy   -16.08 (11.40) 
Gender X Pain Rating X Ingroup Empathy -12.82 (12.44) 
Note. N = 93 groups. Unstandardized regression coefficients (with standard errors) are 
presented. All tests have 1 df.  
* p < .05  
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Figure 1. Three-choice prisoner’s dilemma game matrix (PDG-Alt). This matrix represents a 
social interaction involving two groups (a bolded group and an outlined group). Each 
group has three choices: X represents cooperation, Y represents withdrawal, and Z 
represents competition. The values represent the amount of money (in U.S. cents) that 
each side receives as a function of the two groups’ choices. 
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Figure 2. Logistic regression estimate of the effect of Empathic Concern X Outgroup 
Empathy on cooperation. Higher scores represent more cooperation.  
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Figure 3. Logistic regression estimate of the effect of Guilt X Ingroup Empathy on 
cooperation. Higher scores represent more cooperation. 
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Figure 4. Logistic regression estimate of the effect of Gender X Empathic Concern X 
Outgroup Empathy on competition versus withdrawal. Higher scores represent more 
competition and less withdrawal. Estimates for men are shown in the top panel. 
Estimates for women are shown in the bottom panel. 
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Figure 5. Linear regression estimate of the effect of Pain Rating X Outgroup Empathy on hot 
sauce allocation. 
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